多言を要しない。

　　　　　　視聴すれば分かる。

　　　　　　　　　　読めば分かる。

「物言う知事」はなぜ抹殺されたのか
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhYwPgESCZw
。。

【転載開始】「陸山会」土地購入事件　水谷建設元幹部「ホテルの喫茶店で紙袋入りの現金手渡した」 （FNN）
http://www.asyura2.com/10/senkyo77/msg/563.html
投稿者 ダイナモ 日時 2010 年 1 月 15 日 12:35:56: mY9T/8MdR98ug

http://www.fnn-news.com/news/headlines/articles/CONN00170031.html

民主・小沢幹事長の資金管理団体による土地購入をめぐる事件で、岩手・胆沢(いさわ)ダム建設を受注した鹿島建設の下請けの水谷建設の幹部らが、石川知裕議員と公設第1秘書・大久保隆規被告へそれぞれ5,000万円、あわせて1億円を渡したと供述している。このうちの石川議員への5,000万円が、土地購入資金の一部に充てられた可能性がある。
こうした中、1億円を提供したとされる水谷建設の元幹部が、特捜部に「小沢幹事長側にホテルの喫茶店で紙袋に入れた現金を手渡した」と、詳細な供述をしていることが新たにわかった。
小沢幹事長もよく利用する東京・港区のホテルで、幹部は、石川議員らにあわせて1億円を渡したという。
現金は、紙袋に入っていて、2階のフロント近くの喫茶店で手渡されたという。
水谷建設の幹部らが、特捜部に対し「2004年と2005年にそれぞれ5,000万円、石川知裕議員と大久保 隆規被告に渡した」と供述していることがわかっている。
この喫茶店は人の出入りが多く、新たに判明した供述によれば、小沢幹事長側へのあわせて1億円の現金の資金提供が、紙袋に現金を入れる形で人前で堂々と行われたことになる。
さらに水谷建設の関係者が、「鹿島建設から提供資金が補てんされた」と供述していることもわかり、特捜部は、1億円の資金提供に鹿島建設の関与がなかったか、資料の分析を続けている。
一方、石川議員と大久保被告は、資金の受け取りを全面的に否定している。【転載終了】

【転載開始】小泉政権にものいう福島県知事はなぜ抹殺されたのかhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhYwPgESCZw 再生回数 897 回知事抹殺　つくられた福島県汚職事件http://bookweb.kinokuniya.co.jp/htm/4582824544.html 小泉政権の方針　原発推進、道州制反対、郵政民営化に反対していた知事を突然、襲った、水谷建設元会長による「偽証」この「偽証」を採用したのが現在東京地検特捜部長。このコンビによって、ほうむりさられた　県民の圧倒的支持をうけていた、福島県知事が真相を明らかにする。ちなみに、この知事をほうむりさったときのコンビは今の小沢を攻撃している東京地検特捜部長と水谷建設元会長である。今と同じである。前科を持つ水谷建設元会長は、考えるに違いない。もしかしたら、この獄中から出たら、手厚いものがあるかもしれないと。おかしいのは、もう獄中に入って１年ぐらいたつ人物であり、手元に当時の資料などないに違いない。もともと資料に記録をつけないだろうが、そんな人物が、何月何日に石川議員に５千万円を渡したと明確な日付を証言しているのである。ありえない。誰かに何月何日に５千万円渡したと証言しろといわれているのだと推定される。＜ないものはないというのは実は証明できない。悪魔の証明という＞一方、小沢のほうは、「ないものはない」ということを証明しなければならないのでこれは難しい。ないものはないというのは実は証明できない。悪魔の証明という。たとえば、「私はそれをしていません」「じゃあしていないことを証明しろ」これは非常に困るはずである。していることを証明するこれは簡単である。しかし、していないことを証明せよこれは非常に難しい。下の記事は、苦しまぎれにうそをついていると推定される水谷建設元会長の言い分である、５千万円を、港区の人の出入りの激しいホテルのところで、「堂々と」渡したという。おそらく推定だが、この港区のホテルで、小沢氏もよく利用するというホテルはANAホテルか？確かにうそをつく側としては、ANAホテルだといえば、「ああ、いつも小沢氏がよく利用するホテルだ」となるだろうが、うそをつくのもいい加減にしてもらいたいものだ。【転載終了】

　
【転載開始】＜偽証のテクニック＞私が「うまい」と思ったのは、小沢一郎氏のお金を石川議員が、分割して入金をしているが、４億円のお金を分割して、５千万円を月曜日に入金をしているという。水谷建設の元会長は、５千万円をその前の金曜に渡したと証言しているのである。＜元、政治の中枢にいれば、石川議員が、５千万円を何月何日に入金したかを情報入手できるはず＞つまり、亡国の人物は、先に、石川議員が、何日に分割してお金を入金させているかを検察の捜査を通じて、教えてもらうことができるはずである。<推定される亡国の人物の情報入手の手法＞つまり、検察は、これを「巨悪」として、捜査中であり、もともと政権の中枢にいたような人物が、「これは政治資金規正法」に関係する汚職疑惑の重大な案件だから、興味を持っている。小沢の秘書は、いつごろ４億円を入金しているんだ？」と問い合わせれば、これは、教えるはずである。そして何月何日に５千万円を入金しているとうデータを亡国の人物が得る。入金日が月曜日なのであればその前の金曜日に５千万円を渡した」ということを水谷建設の元会長に、偽証してくれと人を介して依頼している可能性がある。いくらかでも罪を軽くするためには偽証もOKという前科をもつ元会長。＜小泉政権の方針に反対していた福島県知事はこの水谷建設会長の偽証で首が飛んだ＞原発反対派で正義感の強く、道州制も反対していて小泉政権のいうことに反対ばかり唱えていた正義感の強かった福島県知事もこの人物の偽証で首を飛ばされた。【転載終了】

【転載開始】「殺さなければ殺される」そう呻いた地検特捜部長は、己の出世のために小沢を獲る！！

ジャ－ナリズム

公開日：2010/01/23 00:00

　今週の週刊新潮の特集から引用する。（前文略）検察関係者がこう言う。

「法務省に限らず、官庁の局長以上の役職は閣議了解が必要です。西松事件で小沢さんに目の敵にされた佐久間特捜部長は、このままでは出世は絶望的。ですから、“殺さなければ殺される”と周囲に漏らし、とことんまで小沢氏を追い詰めると意気込んでいます。そうしないと自分の将来がないわけですよ」【転載終了】

【転載開始】検察の「頼みの綱」水谷建設元会長に「偽証」の過去・検察から言われたままを証言した［ゲンダイ］
http://www.asyura2.com/10/senkyo78/msg/374.html
投稿者 feel 日時 2010 年 1 月 23 日 01:05:14: /berAdga6DXu.

ゲンダイ　2010年1月23日（22日発行）
「検察から言われたままを証言した」小沢に1億円
水谷建設元会長に「偽証」の過去

自らの実刑回避のため､公判でウソ

「胆沢ダム工事の下請け受注の見返りに、04年と05年に５０００万円ずつ、計１億円を小沢の秘書に渡した」――。小沢幹事長を狙い撃ちにしている検察の”頼みの綱”は、この証言だけだ。証言の主は、中堅ゼネコン「水谷建設」の元会長・水谷功（64＝写真）。法人税法違反（脱税）の罪で実刑判決が確定し、今は獄中の身である。
　
特捜部は水谷証言を武器に、強引な捜査を続けているが、ホントに水谷証言は信用できるのか。水谷には特捜部の□車に乗って、”偽証”をはたらいた前科があるのだ。
　
佐久間達哉特捜部長が、副部長時代に手がけた06年の佐藤栄佐久前福島県知事の収賄事件。２審公判中に水谷は服役中の津刑務所で、佐藤の主任弁護士と面会し、次のように語ったという。

　「１審での供述は、当時自分の裁判（脱税事件）が進行中で、実刑を回避しようと、検察から言われたままを証言した」

　アキれたことに水谷は、もはや自分の裁判での実刑は免れないとみて、本当のことを話そうと思ったのか、「戦術を間違えた。話がしたい」と佐藤の弁護士に直接、コンタクトを取ってきたのだ。

　佐藤前知事の汚職事件で特捜部が描いたシナリオは、①県発注のダム工事の入札をめぐり、00年１月に前知事が”天の声”を出した②その見返りに、落札企業の意向を受けた水谷建設が、前知事の親族会社の所有地を時価よりも高く買い取った――。時価と買い取り額の差額が賄賂にあたるという筋書きだ。

「水谷は１審で『受注の礼に土地を高く買うのだと思った』と証言したが、面会した弁護士の前で『土地取引は自分が儲けようとしてやった。賄賂行為はない』と翻したのです。さらに『ダムの受注は99年５月に、仙台の有カゼネコンＯＢらとの会合で決まった』と新たに証言。これでは、翌年に佐藤前知事が”天の声”を出すまでもなかったことになる」（司法関係者）　水谷は「出廷して正直に話してもいい」との意向を示し、佐藤の弁護側は２審で水谷を証人申請。東京高裁は証人申請を却下したが、弁護側は昨年７月の最終弁論で水谷の新証言を暴露した。

　「福島汚職では贈賄側の時効が成立しており、特捜部は水谷建設などゼネコン関係者から都合のいい調書を多数取ったようです。小沢事件も同じ構図で、昨年夏から何度も水谷氏を取り調べて、冒頭の証言を引き出したのです」（検察事情通）　いいかげんなオッサンの証言に頼らざるを得ないとは、検察も相当、苦しそうだ。【転載終了】

つむじ風

http://hyouhei03.blogzine.jp/tumuzikaze/2010/01/post_368d.html

そういうお金の問題よりも、殺人疑惑があるリソナ銀行等の一連小泉改革の問題を追及

上のブログが表示されないエラーがあったので訂正します。済みません。

]]> http://ameblo.jp/syuugyousya/entry-10442359840.html Thu, 28 Jan 2010 11:41:16 +0900 亀井氏「国民の相当数、冷静な判断能力ない」 (読売新聞)

　国民新党 代表の亀井金融相は２５日、衛星放送ＢＳ１１ の番組で、小沢民主党 幹事長の資金管理団体をめぐる政治資金規正法 違反事件に関して「今の国民は相当数が大脳皮質で冷静に判断する能力をお持ちでない。新聞が『けしからん』と書いたりすると、その人（小沢氏）が何を言っても耳を貸さない」と述べた。

[ 2010年1月26日0時48分 ]

http://news.www.infoseek.co.jp/topics/society/n_shizuka_kamei__20100126_3/story/20100126_yol_oyt1t00070/

誰も知らない小沢夫人の素顔 (ゲンダイネット)

●数億円の貯金もナットクの大金持ちだった

　小沢幹事長が、今週末に検察の聴取に応じるという。一時は、小沢の妻・和子さん（６５）の任意聴取まで取り沙汰され、その存在に注目が集まった。

　西松事件 がなければ、今頃ファーストレディーになっていたかもしれない女性なのに、和子夫人の素顔は、ほとんど知られていない。一体どんな人物なのか。

「和子夫人は、“内助の功”という言葉がピッタリの控えめな人です。ポッチャリ体形で、服装は質素。ブランド品を身につけることもありません。鳩山首相の幸夫人とは正反対のタイプですね。小沢邸での新年会でも、厨房を仕切るなど裏方に徹し、表には出てこない。人手が足りないときには料理を運んで来たりもしますが、自分から挨拶することもなく、すぐにいなくなってしまう。後になって“さっきの女性が奥さんだったの？”と驚く議員も多いそうです」（政治評論家・有馬晴海 氏）

“お手伝いさん”と間違われることもあるくらい地味な印象の和子夫人だが、実はタイヘンな資産家だ。

　田中角栄 の後援会幹部で、新潟県の大手ゼネコン 「福田組」の経営者だった福田正氏の長女。上智大 卒の才媛でもある。

「英語がペラペラで、ダイアナ妃が来日した時は、通訳なしで話したそうだよ。頭がいいことをひけらかさないし、偉ぶらなくて感じのいい人だよ」（地元関係者）

　角栄の仲介で、衆院２期目だった小沢一郎 と７３年に見合い結婚。０９年３月に提出された有価証券 報告書によれば、今も福田組の株式を１３６万３０００株（３．０３％で第８位）も保有している。

「昨年、福田組の第２位の大株主だった父の正氏が亡くなり、和子夫人は株などの財産を相応に相続したと思われます。保有株の資産価値は数億円。配当だけでも、毎年かなりの金額になる。長者番付が公表されていた当時は、和子夫人は高額納税者の常連でした。福田組の監査役を務めていたこともあり、毎年２０００万円前後を納税していた。つまり、６０００万～７０００万円程度の収入があったということです」（ベテラン政治記者）

　それなら、数億円単位の貯金があっても不思議はない。小沢の政治活動をまさに物心両面で支えてきたわけだ。

「平成３年に小沢氏が狭心症 の疑いで入院した時には、献身的に看病。その後も体調を気遣って、小沢氏の昼食は、いつも和子さんお手製のおにぎり２個です」（有馬晴海氏＝前出）

　さしもの小沢も夫人には頭が上がらないという。

（日刊ゲンダイ 2010年1月22日掲載）

[ 2010年1月25日10時00分

http://news.www.infoseek.co.jp/topics/society/n_ichiro_ozawa__20100126_49/story/25gendainet02044390/

小沢氏「心臓病で入院、預金を家族名義に」 (読売新聞)

記事写真 　定例記者会見で質問に答える民主党の小沢幹事長＝安川純撮影

　民主党 の小沢幹事長は２５日、自らの資金管理団体「陸山会 」の政治資金規正法 違反事件で、東京地検 から事情聴取 を受けた後、初めての定例記者会見を行い、同事件で逮捕された秘書らの監督責任に言及した。

　ただ、具体的な責任の取り方には触れなかった。

　記者会見は党本部で行われ、小沢氏は、逮捕された秘書らの監督責任について「（政治資金の管理を）担当者に任せてきたことは事実だ。それがもし誤ったことをしたならば、私の（資金管理団体の）代表者としての責任ももちろんある」と述べた。

　小沢氏は、資金管理団体が購入した土地の資金４億円のうち３億６０００万円を家族名義の口座から引き出したと説明している。家族名義の口座に多額の金があった理由については「１９９１年に心臓の病で入院した。万が一の時に、という意識があって家族名義にしたのではないか」と述べた。

　自らの国会への参考人招致については「与野党で議論することなので、その結果に従う」と述べた。

　小沢氏はまた、事情聴取の際の検察側とのやりとりを一部紹介し「（検察から）『水谷建設 から５０００万円の提供があったと言われているが、いかがか』という話があった。私は『５０００万円を受け取ったり（土地）購入資金に充てたという事実は全くないし、その他の会社からも不正な資金提供を受けたことはない。秘書もそのような金は受け取っていないと信じている』と申し上げた。繰り返しの問答はあまりなかった」と語った。

[ 2010年1月25日19時32分 ]

http://news.www.infoseek.co.jp/topics/society/backnumber/n_ichiro_ozawa__20100125_46/story/20100125_yol_oyt1t01049/

]]> http://ameblo.jp/syuugyousya/entry-10443105526.html Tue, 26 Jan 2010 11:04:01 +0900

]]> http://ameblo.jp/syuugyousya/entry-10442362070.html Mon, 25 Jan 2010 12:20:41 +0900 明日、ジョセフ・プリンシオッタさんの講演会、神戸で／長い夜にこの映画を！ （きくちゆみさんのブログ）

ジョセフさんの話は、元犯罪現場の科学捜査官としての視点から、９１１事件を犯罪ととらえた興味深い、とてもわかりやすいお話です。これまで９１１事件の真相を伝える著名な人たちのお話を翻訳・通訳してきましたが、ジョセフさんのお話が最も一般の人にはわかりやすい、と思いました。関西方面の方はぜひおでかけください。

＜ジョセフさんのお話を聞く会＞
日程：１２月２７日（日）
時間：１８：３０～２１：００ころまで
会費：１０００円　（交通費カンパとして）
場所：健康道場サラ・シャンティ　　
（阪急六甲駅を八幡神社側に出て右、最初の角を左折して角から２軒目の左側のビルクレアール六甲２階）
連絡申し込み　TEL&FAX: 078-802-5120　sala_santi@rondo.ocn.ne.jp

＜ジョセフ・プリンシオッタ　プロフィール＞
19歳のとき米海軍兵士として横須賀に駐留。 除隊後、科学捜査官（犯罪現場の科学捜査をする仕事）として３５年間働く。定年後、アラスカで彫刻家として活躍。 911事件で消防士だったいとこ二人を失い、この事件を「大量殺人事件の犯罪」として調査し続けているロータリークラブ会員。夢は日本とアラスカに半分ずつ住むこと。

この講演会にご参加できない方は、長い夜にこちらのドキュメンタリーをどうぞ。

　どうもアメーバのブログでは、重要な表示させないようにしている。飛んで見て下さい。

http://video.google.co.jp/videoplay?docid=607681952387561020&hl=ja#

９１１事件の真相

http://kikuchiyumi.blogspot.com/search/label/911

]]> http://ameblo.jp/syuugyousya/entry-10420600684.html Sun, 27 Dec 2009 14:36:22 +0900

Animated graphic depicting the devastating effects of a 300 kiloton nuclear airburst over the Pentagon as described in an article by Lynn Eden in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists . (Graphic animation produced by Rock Creek Creative )

Click here for a larger version

"It Is Certain There Will be Many Firestorms" (1)

New Evidence on the Origins of Overkill

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 108

Edited by William Burr

January 14, 2004

Read the press release

Scenarios of nuclear attacks on the United States, whether by terrorist or state adversaries, have assumed that Washington, D.C. would be a major target. A startling article published as the cover story of the January-February 2004 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists describes the enormously destructive effects to the Washington, D.C. area if, on a clear day, an adversary exploded, 1500 feet above the Pentagon, a nuclear weapon with an explosive force of 300 kilotons (20 times the explosive force of the Hiroshima weapon). (Note 2 ) This horrifying scenario, prepared by Stanford University nuclear historian Lynn Eden, shows the weapon's blast effects crushing the Pentagon and knocking down nearby buildings. But the blast effects would be confined to a considerably smaller area than the much larger area set ablaze by the fantastically high levels of thermal energy released by the bomb. Paper, wood, office furnishings, and other common combustibles would be quickly ignited. "Within tens of minutes, the entire area, approximately 40 to 65 square miles--everything within 3.5 or 6.4 miles of the Pentagon--would be engulfed in a mass fire" that would "extinguish all life and destroy almost everything else." The creation of a "hurricane of fire," Eden argues, is a predictable effect of a high-yield nuclear weapon.

Lynn Eden's article draws on a chapter from her extraordinary study, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation , published by Cornell University Press in January 2004. The article and the book examine why, even though nuclear weapons reliably produce fire effects, U.S. nuclear war planners never systematically took firestorms into account when they targeted adversaries. According to Eden, a "very conservative estimate" would be that firestorms, also called mass fires, "double the damage" caused by modern nuclear weapons. (Note 3 ) Yet instead of treating mass fire as a standard effect of high-yield weapons, military planners focused their attention only on blast effects which, Eden argues, led them to underestimate the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. (Note 4 ) That miscalculation meant that throughout the Cold War and since, the U.S. nuclear arsenal was far more devastating than most civilian and military officials understood. Underestimating the capabilities of nuclear weapons meant that larger numbers of civilian casualties ("collateral damage") became more likely, even if most weapons were aimed at military targets only. This also meant that the U.S. produced far more nuclear weapons than were necessary to achieve the military and political objectives sought by the White House and the Pentagon, thus raising their already formidable costs. (Note 5 ) In her stimulating study, Eden asks: why did Air Force nuclear planners develop plans and methodologies that predicted blast damage only and systematically ignored the mass fires that were no less predictable?

The blast damage that has received the near-exclusive attention of nuclear planners is one of the 'prompt" or immediate effects of a nuclear detonation. The explosion creates a powerful blast wave that places objects within its path under severe, sharp increases in atmospheric pressure. The increase in air pressure that the blast wave causes is known as "overpressure," the air pressure over and above normal sea-level air pressure (14.7 pounds per square inch [psi]). Attending the blast wave are powerful transient winds that exert "drag pressure" or "dynamic pressure" on structures. Eden's scenario of an attack on the Pentagon scenario demonstrates the impact of overpressure and dynamic pressure. The overpressure at Pentagon City, less than a mile from the detonation, would be 36 psi, approximately the same as that Hiroshima ground zero on August 6, 1945. "The compressed air and winds associated with the shock could cave in buildings and might even topple large office buildings." (Note 6 )

Chronological development of an air burst; 3 seconds after 20-kiloton detonation; 11 seconds after 1-megaton detonation. Note the tremendous wind velocity and the high levels of thermal radiation measured in "Cal/Sq CM" (calories per square centimeter), a measurement of energy deposited on surfaces. (Note 7 )

As Eden argues, Air Force nuclear planners developed an "organizational frame"--the approach to defining and solving problems that organizations use--that continuously centered their thinking and planning on blast effects. The development of the "blast damage frame," she contends, was a "self-reinforcing organizational processes," much of it "sealed off from the public through secrecy and opacity." It had its origins in World War II bombing campaigns and was reinforced by studies of the damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By the early 1950s, "Physical Vulnerability" analysts working for Air Force intelligence had developed a Vulnerability Number (VN) system that helped predict blast damage with considerable accuracy. (Note 8 ) The nuclear test series of the 1950s helped nuclear planners refine their thinking about the VN system, but they were not interested in examining or predicting damage from firestorms. Although PV officials recognized that nuclear explosions could cause mass fires, they believed that they involved too many imponderables to make them a predictable phenomenon. Nuclear testers even took pains to ensure that structures did not catch fire so they could better measure the effects of blast. Eden details how the famously photographed House No. 1, destroyed by blast in nuclear weapon test "Shot Annie" on 17 March 1953 was made highly fire-resistant beforehand.

U.S. Government photos from "Shot Annie", Nevada Test Site; courtesy of Lynn Eden (Note 9 )

By the late 1970s, Eden shows, the influential physicist Harold Brode of Pacific-Sierra Research focused attention on the problem of nuclear firestorms and the extent to which simultaneous ignitions were predictable effects of nuclear explosions. During the 1980s, Brode and colleagues under contract to the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) developed a methodology for predicting mass fire that could be incorporated into the nuclear war plans developed by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS). Their research would have made it possible to develop a fire-blast VN system that could more comprehensively predict the effects of nuclear detonations. In the early 1990s, however, JSTPS Deputy Director Vice-Admiral Michael Colley cancelled further research on nuclear fire effects. Despite Brode's innovations, Colley believed that fire was not predictable and that efforts to develop a fire-blast VN system for war planning were unnecessary: "to my mind, fire is gravy. Whatever you can get from fire just makes everything worse. And you don't need to particularly measure it. It's just there." (Note 10 )

Declassified material elucidating the serious problems raised by Lynn Eden's study is scarce or otherwise highly technical. (Note 11 ) The following documents from the 1950s and early 1960s provide evidence of the powerful influence of a "blast damage frame" not only in the military but also among nuclear weapons experts at the State Department. Other documents show, however, that some policy experts believed that mass fires were routine effects of high-yield nuclear weapons. When the newly-created JSTPS developed the first SIOP [Single Integrated Operational Plan] in 1960, some senior officials, including White House Science Adviser George Kistiakowsky and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke argued that the JSTPS was building "overkill" into nuclear war plans by not taking fire effects into account. Despite these arguments, however, a JSTPS report shows that it believed that mass fires were unpredictable and not worth planning for. The blast damage frame held by PV and JSTPS officials remained unchallenged until the early 1980s when nuclear weapons effects experts Harold Brode convinced the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) to sponsor studies on nuclear fire storms. Most of the publicly available Brode material is highly technical but the document excerpted below provides evidence of his proposition that mass fires are predictable weapons effects.

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Documents

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Document 1 : U.S. Air Force Project RAND, Implications of Large-Yield Nuclear Weapons, 10 July 1952, Top Secret, Excised Copy
Source: FOIA Release, U.S. Air Force

At the beginning of the 1950s, when thermonuclear weapons were being developed, the Air Force's civilian research arm, Project RAND (acronym for "research and development") began exploring the implications of these fearsome new weapons. The study, conducted by Bernard Brodie, Charles Hitch, and Ernst Plesset, was widely briefed in the national security establishment up to President Truman himself. Characterizing thermonuclear weapons as "killers and fantastically destructive," the RAND analysts looked at such problems as weapons effects, the impact of Soviet acquisition, the possibility of defense, and offensive uses. The discussion of weapons effects looked beyond the destruction caused by blast and straightforwardly addressed the "increased probability of fire." Looking at the impact of a five megaton bomb dropped on a city, the analysts concluded that "a firestorm must be expected as far out" as four miles from ground zero. Given such devastating effects, the authors concluded that "large-scale reciprocal use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons against cities would not fall short of national suicide for both sides." That this made nuclear war wholly inconsistent with any rational political objective would trouble Brodie and his colleagues for the rest of their careers. While the Brodie-Hitch-Plesset scenario depicted the varied effects of a thermonuclear explosion, the "blast effects frame" had strong influence at RAND and the organization's work tended to reinforce it. (Note 12 )

Document 2 : Memorandum for the File, "Discussion with the Secretary" by Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Gerard C. Smith, 16 March 1957, Top Secret
Source: National Archives, Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State, Records of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Subject Files of Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Aerospace, 1950-1966, box 6, II.3.B Weapons Effects - 1955-57

This document on the nuclear education of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles illustrates the predominance of the "blast damage frame." After Dulles made press conference statements that underestimated the fallout hazards associated using low-yield nuclear weapons, his special assistant Gerard C. Smith took Dulles aside to give him a better grasp of the issue. In particular, Smith wanted to make sure that Dulles understood that the U.S. Air Force would never accept tactical nuclear weapons as a substitute for strategic bombardment. After Dulles took issue with the statement that megaton nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union would "cause tremendous destruction of life and property," Smith realized that his chief needed better information but he could go no further at the moment because others in the room lacked "Q" clearances for atomic energy information. When Smith found an opportunity for a briefing, Dulles learned that "if the SAC strikes were successful … Russian casualties would be in the tens of millions." The criterion that Smith used for nuclear devastation was blast destruction: if the megatonnage of nuclear weapons dropped on Soviet cities was "divided into the total area of Russia, it would "result in substantial over-pressure over the whole area." Had he included mass fire damage, casualties would have been stated as even greater.

Document 3 : Letter from Captain John H. Morse, Special Assistant to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to Lewis Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 14 February 1957, Secret
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Records of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, box 17, Target Systems (1957-1961)

John H. Morse, who had served as director of atomic planning in the air operations branch of the U.S. European Command, brought his experience to bear in this discussion of nuclear planning by the military. While he does not mention blast or fire effects, his description of Air Force target planning methodology is plainly relevant to the "blast damage frame," with such references as "damage to concrete structures" and the requirement for a "high probability of cratering runways." Particularly fascinating is Morse's concern over the "destructive and disruptive nature of nuclear weapons" with megaton yields: "the cumulative or ancillary effects may be as great or greater than primary damage." While Morse only mentions fallout, firestorms are consistent with his brief discussion of "cumulative" effects. Significantly, he called attention to a Pentagon study that questioned the tendency of nuclear planners to overlook "bonus" effects; the report concluded that by taking into account the total impact of a nuclear explosion, lower-yield weapons could be used to achieve the "desired destruction." Morse noted that the Pentagon "rigorously suppressed" this study and destroyed all copies. (Note 13 )

Document 4 : "Nuclear Weapons", Briefing for Secretary Herter, with "Weapons Effects Briefing for Undersecretary of State," 27 March 1957
Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Subject Files of Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Aerospace, 1950-1966, box 6, II.3.B Weapons Effects - 1955-57

Not long after becoming Under Secretary of State in February 1957, Christian A. Herter received a standard briefing, apparently involving Gerard Smith and General Herbert Loper, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, on nuclear weapons and their effects. The outline of the briefing on weapons effects provided details on the vulnerabilities of inanimate objects and humans. With respect to the vulnerabilities of buildings, etc., blast was the "primary destruction agent." The outline identified thermal radiation as a cause of fires, even noting the "ignition energies" for fuels, wood, and paper, but apparently did not see fire as important as blast in producing destruction. On the vulnerabilities of humans, the outline gave full attention to gamma radiation and fallout dangers, treating thermal radiation and blast effects as relatively less important as casualty producers. That Smith and his colleagues did not take fire into account is suggested in the section of "protective measures" where "cover" is listed as a way to evade thermal effects. As Eden's scenario suggests, however, those who might seek shelter in basements in Arlington or Capital Hill would not find protection from heat or carbon monoxide.

Document 5 : Letter from Brigadier General George S. Brown, Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense, to Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air Command Thomas Powers, 23 November 1960, Top Secret
Source: FOIA Release, Department of Defense

Not everyone was persuaded by Air Force arguments favoring "overbombing", but it remained difficult to change the direction of nuclear planning. In 1960, various organizational pressures led President Eisenhower to approve the creation of a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) that through interservice coordination would produce a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a comprehensive nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). JSTPS's director would be the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), thus putting SAC effectively in charge of nuclear planning. This development had been a source of heartburn for Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke, who saw it as an Air Force power play to erode the JCS's authority in nuclear planning. Burke failed to convince Eisenhower that there was a serious problem and during 1960 the JSTPS developed what would become known as SIOP-62 (for fiscal year 1962). A plan for a massive strike against military, government control, and urban-industrial targets in the Soviet Union, China, and allied countries, the SIOP, as David Rosenberg has put it, produced the "institutionalization of overkill." (Note 14 ) The relationship of the SIOP to the "overkill" phenomenon and the "blast damage frame" is evident from General George S. Brown's letter to CINCSAC Thomas Power. What Brown wanted Power to know was that Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates believed that the SIOP needed more work, not least because "weapons requirements are perhaps increased unrealistically by restricting consideration of weapons effects to blast damage" while there had been no effort to "apply thermal effects and even radiation" to target planning. It is possible that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke or White House Science Adviser George Kistiakowsky (see documents 6 and 7) made Gates aware of the problem of excessive weapons requirements. However, he would have no opportunity to follow up the problem because the Eisenhower administration was then on its way out.

Document 6 : Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke to Flag and General Officers, "National Strategic Target List and Single Integrated Operational Plan," Special Edition Flag Officers Dope, 4 December 1960, Secret
Source: U.S. Navy Operational Archives, Arleigh Burke Papers, Memos and Ltrs (NSTL)

Arleigh Burke acquiesced in Eisenhower's decision to go forward with the JSTPS; not surprisingly he saw serious problems in SIOP-62. While characterizing it as a "good first" step in a report to the Navy's high command, he made it plain that he saw significant weaknesses. Like Secretary Gates, Burke was especially concerned about the SIOP's damage criteria which he believed were unrealistically high: "the damage on the facilities at Hiroshima which were incapable of any type of operation and never were repaired in peacetime would not have met this damage criteria." He also believed that using blast effects only to compute nuclear devastation was a drawback: "it is certain that there will be many firestorms and damage by neutrons beyond the area of blast damage" (see page 5).

Document 7 : Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 2056/208, 27 January 1961, enclosing memorandum from Secretary of Defense Gates to the Chairman, JCS, 20 January 1961, and Excerpts from Memorandum to President Eisenhower from Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology George Kistiakowsky, 25 November 1960, Top Secret, Excised Copy
Source: National Archives, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, 3205 Target Systems (17 Aug 59) Sec. 9

Burke and Gates were not the only senior officials who expressed reservations about SIOP-62. The White House science adviser, Harvard chemistry professor George S. Kistiakowsky, traveled to SAC headquarters in November 1960 where he heard JSTPS briefings on the war plan. He shared Burke's doubts about the damage criteria because they led to "unnecessary and undesirable overkill." Kistiakowsky also recognized the limits of the blast damage approach: he wrote to Eisenhower that "The JSTPS used blast effects as the only criterion of damage and neglected thermal radiation, fires which will be caused by it and fall-out" (see p. 1914). The day he turned in his report, Kistiakowsky briefed Eisenhower on his findings; the latter confided to his naval aide Captain E.P. Aurand that the briefing "frightened the devil out of me." Eisenhower was surprised by the numbers of targets and the huge scale of the attack plan. Believing that there had to be limits, he wondered whether it might be better to let SAC "have one wack--not ten wacks" at each target. But it was too late for Eisenhower to change the direction of U.S. war planning. (Note 15 )

Document 8 : JSTPS Report 3-61, Staff Study, "Damage Criteria," 3 June 1961
Source: FOIA Release, U.S. Strategic Command

The huge excisions from this study show how sensitive the issue of nuclear devastation has been to the U.S. military. Certainly, the residual content that has been left shows the supremacy of the "blast damage frame" for measuring nuclear weapons destruction. Thus, Annex A begins by discussing the vulnerability number (VN) system used for predicting blast damage. That the JSTPS wholly discounted Gates', Burke's, and Kistiakowsky's thinking about the likelihood of mass fires is evident on page 10. There, the JSTPS analysts briefly discussed the problem and possibility of nuclear fire effects. After noting that the spread of fire depended on a number of considerations and reviewing the damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they concluded that firestorms were unpredictable: They are "not a special characteristic of nuclear explosions. They may or may not occur."

To help make their case about the unpredictability of fire effects, the JSTPS analysts argued that the plutonium weapon that devastated Nagasaki did not produce a firestorm. Yet, strong evidence shows otherwise, despite the important geographical differences between Hiroshima (where mass fire is undisputed) and Nagasaki. Citing MIT scientist Theodore Postol, who has argued that Nagasaki was "Hiroshima in a fireplace," Eden maintains that mass fire also occurred at Nagasaki. That city is "Located in an upward sloping valley" and the valley's sides "acted like the walls of a giant fireplace and the upward slope acted like a flue." Fire spread up the flue, from low to high ground. (Note 16 )

Document 9 : Harold Brode and Richard D. Small, Fire Damage and Strategic Targeting, PSR [Pacific Sierra Research] Note 567, sponsored by DNA, Washington, D.C. (Los Angeles: PSR, June 1983), excerpts
Source: courtesy of Lynn Eden

Nearly twenty years after JSTPS analysts dismissed the problem of mass fire physicists Harold Brode and Richard Small were intensively researching the fire damage issue in studies for the Defense Nuclear Agency. In this document, their first major study on fire for DNA, Brode and Small tacitly disagreed with the earlier JSTPS approach by arguing that a nuclear detonation "ensures a very large number of ignitions and the rapid development of a large area fire." Therefore, in spite of such uncertainties as weather and civil defense measures, among other factors, "fire damage can be predicted with useful consistency" and can be "as reliable as corresponding blast damage predictions." Because fire was likely to cause "more complete and permanent damage," including it in damage prediction methodology would improve the accuracy of nuclear war planning. Recognizing that nuclear war is a nasty business, they wrote, "A new damage methodology including fire effects need not wait for changes in national objectives. If 'moderate damage' to 'steel frame' buildings is the appropriate guide for destroying a city of a million or more inhabitants, then fire can only complete the job more effectively." (Note 17 )

Eden's book shows that Brode made significant progress in winning support for his methodology, but skepticism about the predictability of firestorms remained a powerful obstacle and the JSTPS cut off funding for additional research on the subject in the early 1990s. (Note 18 ) Documentation on the JSTPS's decision remains classified; so does information on the Pentagon's apparently more positive interest in the mass fire problem in the late 1990s. By shedding light on basic elements of the U.S. nuclear posture these issues warrant further investigation by journalists and scholars alike.

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Notes

1. Quotation from Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, December 1960 (see document 6)

2. Eden chose a 300 kiloton weapon because "many weapons in modern arsenals have yields of 300 kilotons or more." On the U.S. side, Minuteman IIIa's and MX's have yields of 335 and 300 respectively, while Russian ICBM warheads have yields ranging from 550 to 750 kilotons. See Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 270-271.

3. See Eden interview for "The American Experience: Race for the Superbomb," at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/filmmore/reference/interview/eden.html >. A study done for the Defense Nuclear Agency in 1990 estimated fire damage radii as "2 to 5 times larger" than for blast effects. Eden, Whole World on Fire, p. 246.

4. In making this argument, Eden builds upon David A. Rosenberg's pioneering research on the history of U.S. nuclear strategy; see Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," in Steven Miller, ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 113-182.

5. Stephen Schwartz, et al. Atomic Audit : The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998).

6. This description of blast effects draws upon Federation of American Scientists, "Nuclear Weapons Blast Effects," at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/blast.htm >. Quotation from Eden, Whole World on Fire, at p. 19.

7. Image from Samuel Glasstone, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), as reproduced, with the other stages of the air burst, on the "Trinity Atomic Web Site" <http://www.cddc.vt.edu/host/atomic/nukeffct/airburst.htm >.

8. For examples of VN ratings of targets, see Natural Resources Defense Council, The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2001), p. 122; see also <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/warplan/warplan_ch5.pdf >.

9. For a digitalized film of the same event, shot from slightly different perspective, viewable with "Quick Time," see <http://www.cddc.vt.edu/host/atomic/nukeffct/effct01a.mov > on the "Trinity Atomic Web Site."

10. Eden, Whole World on Fire, p. 275.

11. Eden worked from documents released through Freedom of Information Act requests, some of which were prepared jointly by her and the National Security Archive. She also worked from other archival documents, unclassified government reports, and interviews.

12. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983), pp. 81-82.

13. At first glance, it would seem that Morse was referring to the Army-Navy study "Project Budapest," that, according to David A. Rosenberg, was a "devastating critique" of Air Force nuclear planning. But "Budapest" was not presented to the Joint Chiefs until August 1957, some months later, so the study that Morse mentions must have been a forerunner. For details on "Budapest," see Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," p. 161.

14. Ibid., pp. 114-115, 174. For further discussion of Burke's battle, see Kaplan, Wizards, pp. 264-266.

15. Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill, p. 118.

16. Eden, Whole World on Fire, p. 20.

17. Ibid, pp. 233-238, for discussion of this study.

18. Ibid, chapters 9 and 10.

元記事

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